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Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation
– Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeu-
vre in the European Union?
1 Introduction
In the recent literature on economic policy, an old theme (see Hansen (1967))
has re-appeared1: Once the economic policy actor falls apart into different
agents – such as the Central Bank and Fiscal Authorities – forming their own
and independent preferences and market actors are able to assert impacts
on what is commonly taken as endogenous to them (such as Trade Unions
on the price level), the simple assignment of single instruments and targets
to single actors – the price level (objective) and interest rates (instrument)
to Central Banks, the employment level (objective) and real wages (instru-
ment) to Trade Unions and output stability (objective) and fiscal balances
(instrument) to the Fiscal Authority – becomes untenable.2 Since the semi-
1This was only possible, after the policy ineffectiveness hypothesis of New Classical
Macroeconomics has lost its dominant grip on the thinking of the economics profession – a
development which Akerlof (2007) dubbed the ”End of After Keynesian Macroeconomics“.
2One could think of the assignment of policy instruments to policy actors, involving
clear policy rules, as a special case of (ex ante) policy coordination. The compliance to
1
nal papers of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Nordhaus (1994), a great number
of papers3 has demonstrated that cooperation among the policy actors gains
superior welfare results (a cooperative as compared to a non-cooperative
Nash-equilibrium).
Although this theoretical renaissance is rather new and has certainly not
yet gained the support of the entire economics profession4, it has already
left traces in the procedure of policy-making in the European Union: Since
1999, a European Macroeconomic Dialogue (EMD) is established under the
provisions of the so called ”Cologne Process“ in order to do exactly what
the policy games literature recommends; i.e. to establish a coordination of
the macroeconomic policy areas of monetary, fiscal and wage policy in order
to create the macroeconomic environment for sustained growth in Europe
(see Heise (2002a)). However, a glance at the figures seems to support those
critics5 which largely deny the efficient working of the EMD:
Euro-Zone USA UK
Inflation rate (consumption deflator) 2.0 2.2 1.8
Real GDP growth rate 2.1 2.9 2.7
Unemployment 8.4 5.0 5.1
Table 1: Selected comparative data on the Euro-Zone, the US and the UK;
1999 – 2006 (annual averages); Source: Commission (2007)
Whatever the reasons may be why the EMD is not efficiently coordinating
the specified policy rules implies the preponderance of a cooperative Nash equilibrium.
However, the assumption of compliance would simply rule out strategic behaviour and,
thus, assumes away what game theory predicts so relentlessly: rationality with regret.
3See e.g. Rankin (1998), Power and Rowe (1998), Dullien (2004), Buti (2003). In other
papers – such as Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Guzzo and Velasco (1999) or Jerger (2002)
– the interdependence of various policy areas is acknowledged, yet it is seen merely from
the perspective of non-cooperative games.
4The assignment approach is still preferred by all those who argue on the lines of long-
run reasoning (for when even most New Keynesians would recognise the common neutrality
postulates) and who fear an obliteration of responsibilities (see e.g. Issing (2001), Issing
(2002). For a criticism on this see Jerger and Landmann (2006).
5The list of critics is long: see e.g. Allsopp and Artis (2003), Heise (2008b), Collignon
(2008), Watt and Hallwirth (2003) and Jerger and Landmann (2006).
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the macroeconomic policy areas, the question arises as to whether there are
other, more viable options for the establishment of cooperation which serves
the interests of the actors involved as well as overall welfare? We will argue
that the contentious issues could be resolved if European Trade Unions (TU)
and the European Central Bank (ECB) took a fresh look at the different
options before them. The central question however is, what conditions must
be fulfilled in order for the actors not to be entangled in the well-known
cooperation traps? The focus of the paper is not on a re-organisation of
the European Macroeconomic Dialogue – i.e. no reshaping of institutional
incentives6 – but rather to inquire as to what can be achieved in a context
without formal institutions.
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, the theoretical framework un-
derlying our analysis is presented in order to allow the readers to appraise
the necessity of policy coordination in general and of an active policy stance
in particular. Thereafter, the effects and preconditions for building up rep-
utation are presented. Reputation is discussed as the informal substitute
for an institutional setting allowing for cooperative behaviour. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn for the possibility of a more growth-enhancing macroe-
conomic policy mix in the European Union.
6This has been done elsewhere: see e.g. Dullien (2004), Heise (2008a).
3
2 The underlying Post Keynesian model
The stylised Post Keynesian model presented here is an elaboration of Set-
terfield (2006) and Heise (2008a):
Dt = α(wt, m¯, It, G¯, Lt) (1)
Zt = β(wt, T¯ , Lt) (2)
Dt ≡ Zt (3)
pt = γ(wˆt, T¯ ) (4)
wˆt = δ(Y
gap
t , p¯e,
¯IF ) (5)
Y
gap
t = Yt − YTrend (6)
Yt = θ(K¯, Lt, T¯ ) (7)
It = λ(it, E¯) (8)
it = µ(i
CB
t , L¯P ) (9)
iCBt = φ(p
gap
t , Y
gap
t ) (10)
p
gap
t = pt − p
∗ (11)
pt ≡ Pˆt (12)
where D is the value of aggregate demand, Z is the value of aggregate
supply, w is the nominal wage rate, m¯ is the (given) investment multiplier, I
is nominal private investment outlays, G¯ is (given) governmental spending, T¯
is (given) technology, L is the level of employment, p is the inflation rate, wˆ
is wage inflation, ¯IF are institutional factors (collective bargaining system),
Y is real income, YTrend is (given) trend income, p¯e is the (given) expected
inflation rate, K is the (given) stock of real capital, i is the long-term interest
rate, E¯ is a (given) schedule of expected profit rates, iCBt is the Central Bank’s
instrument variable, L¯P is the (given) schedule of liquidity preferences, p∗ is
the targeted inflation rate.
The model comprises an aggregate demand – aggregate supply section
(eq. 1–3) determining the equilibrium employment level, an ordinary pro-
duction function (eq. 7), a Phillips curve (eq. 5–6), mark-up pricing (eq.
4), a (Taylor-rule) monetary reaction function (eq. 9–12) and a Keynesian
investment function (eq. 8). The model is distinctly Post Keynesian in na-
ture, as the employment level depends on the propensity to consume, the
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incentive to invest, the nature of long-term expectations and liquidity pref-
erence considerations (Keynes (1936, p. 250)) and there is neither reason to
believe that equilibrium employment (labour demand) just matches labour
supply nor any automatic process (e.g. through wage cuts as in Walrasian
models) to dynamically adjust supply and demand: as the money supply
is endogenously determined, nominal wage reductions will certainly reduce
the price level but not necessarily the (real) quantity of money. Hence, the
working (and direction) of the real-balance effect and the adjustment path of
employment primarily depends crucially on expectation and liquidity prefer-
ence effects. Although these are not modelled here (as E¯ and L¯P in eq. 8 and
9 are taken as given), there is good reason to believe that Keynes was right
in pleading for a wage policy (and, hence, a collective bargaining system; i.e.
¯IF in eq. 5) which keeps nominal unit labour cost largely constant (Heise
(2006a)). Unemployment in such a Post Keynesian framework is not rooted
in institutional or market rigidities, yet particular institutional settings of
wage and monetary policy7 can be correlated with distinct employment and
inflation performances: the existence of ”market constellations“ has been the
object of recent intensive inquiry.8
Although the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)
concept has been seen very critically by most Post Keynesians (e.g. Galbraith
(1997), Davidson (1998), a conflicting claims approach to unemployment and
inflation in different institutional settings is fully compatible with the Post
Keynesian market constellation concept outlined above. Both, monetary
and fiscal policies are able to affect aggregate demand (eq. 1 and 8–10) and,
hence, assert measurable impacts on employment and growth. However, the
viability and effectiveness of such Keynesian demand management policies
rests crucially on the degree of avoidance of social conflict as regulated by
the collective bargaining system (see Tsakalotos (2006)) encapsulated in ¯IF
in eq. 5 and the monetary policy rule as in eq. 10. If a price stability-oriented
7Of course, fiscal policy should be included. However, for the sake of simplicity, we
have not specified any fiscal policy rule. This has been done elsewhere; see Heise (2008a,
p. 104 ff.).
8See e.g. Heise (2006b), Heise (2008a), Fritsche, Heine, Herr, Horn and Kaiser (2005),
Priewe and Herr (2005).
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wage formula were within reach of consciously acting TUs, then the CB could
boost the economy without risking soaring inflation.
For Europe such a formula is indeed within reach as recent coordination
initiatives of European trade union confederations have shown.9 As a con-
sequence, the two macroeconomic miseries – inflation and unemployment –
could be eased to a certain extent if only the interaction between the ECB
and the European TUs would be more coordinated. If cooperation is given
a chance, then employment expansion could be reached without formal in-
stitutions – which will be shown in the next section by introducing a time
horizon and the concept of reputation.
3 Repeated interaction, reputation, and a high
employment equilibrium
This section is organised as follows. Firstly, the dilemma of an active central
bank (CB)10 interacting with an uncooperative TU in a single-stage game is
considered; then the picture is made somewhat more complex as the possibil-
ity of a cooperative TU is added. This reflects the diversity of concepts (and
empirical experiences) associated with wage policy (see Hyman (2001)).
Fig. 1: The single-stage game
The single-stage game is depicted in Figure 1. The most probable outcome
is an unemployment rate as high as the initial equilibrium unemployment in
9These were initiated by a resolution of the European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC) in 2000; see ETUC (2000, p. 60). Coordination rounds now exist in many Euro-
pean branches and at ETUC level.
10An active (or ”bold“ as termed by Dullien (2004)) CB can be characterised by a) a
high preference for output stabilisation in relation to price stabilisation and b) a symmetric
reaction function with respect to deviation of actual inflation from its targeted magnitude.
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a non-cooperative setting (termed here as a ”Post Keynesian NAIRU“). But
there is also a slight chance that the CB might take the risk associated with
employment expansion (if TUs cooperate this risk pays off, otherwise the CB
suffers a utility loss). After having analysed this model, another twist will
be added with a repetition of the game which allows for reputation effects.
It will be shown that this increases the chance for employment expansion.
3.1 Results in a single-stage game
The assumption is that the stylised CB’s utility function comprises the in-
flation rate as well as the employment level (eq. 13) while the stylised TU’s
utility function comprises the growth rate of real wages (i.e. the growth rate
of nominal wages and the inflation rate) and the employment level (eq. 14):
UCB = ψ(pt, Lt) (13)
UTU = φ(pt, wˆt, Lt) (14)
Moreover, the CB is assumed to move first (see fig. 1). Only this case is
considered here because the CB is making decisions more often than the
trade unions (i.e. is less prone to large losses because of the immediate
possibility to revise action).11
The bliss point C of an employment-oriented CB can be seen in Figure 2.
It reflects a preference for a target inflation rate p∗ and a high employment
position or a low unemployment rate u∗, respectively. The ”fallback position“
F would result from the interaction of an uncooperative TU with a ”con-
servative“ CB, which can be seen as the conventional wisdom of the NAIRU
model.12
11The frequent decisions of the CB are put forward as an argument for a follower role
of the CB in some studies regarding the CB-TU interaction. However, it must be noted
here that a concerted first move of European TUs does not resemble the empirical piture
so far; see Traxler (2007, p. 111). Another reason to move first may be that the CB wants
to signal its ”independence“ to financial market participants.
12It is important to note that the notion of a ’conservative’ CB is used here in a slightly
different manner than is commonly done. In this article it does not mean a high weight of
price stability in relation to output stability but rather an asymmetric reaction function
with respect to price stabilisation.
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This model has an interesting feature: the CB cannot fall below the
utility level in F , as will be seen later. The fixed point of this section is an
employment-friendly view of the CB. The CB could get to its bliss point C
starting from point F by lowering interest rates and stimulating employment
expansion (see the economic model sketched above). The CB loss function
(from which the utility function derives) is assumed to have standard shape
with deviations from target values of unemployment and inflation having
quadratic weight:
LCB = (pt − p
∗)2 + b · (ut − u
∗)2 (15)
For the game theoretic considerations undertaken here, which include the
analysis of CB behaviour under uncertainty, it is important to note that if
the CB puts something at risk by stimulating an employment expansion, it
must also consider the possible disinflation costs, which accrue if the TUs
choose an aggressive wage policy resulting in an acceleration of inflation.
Therefore to cover this case, the CB utility level in point T in Figure 2 also
includes the discounted losses incurred by subsequent disinflation process,
which is not modelled explictly to simplify matters.
Fig. 2: Different reference points for the CB
The TUs represent the second actor in the game. In the cooperative case
it is assumed they will act as a unit. A well functioning wage coordination is a
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precondition for this.13 An uncooperative TU will respond to CB-led employ-
ment expansion with ”aggressive“ wage claims. This will subsequently lead
to a higher inflation rate. The result is point T on the (short run) Phillips
curve in Figure 3, which follows from the special shape of the unions’ indif-
ference contours.14 The indifference contours result from the utility function
in eq. (14).15
If we look at the utility levels of the uncooperative TU depicted in Fig-
ure 3, we can see an interesting feature. Payoffs are normalized to values
between 0 and 1 for ease of exposition. Least preferred is point F (payoff 0),
most preferred is ”Temptation“ T (payoff 1). The intermediate value d in
point C reveals a paradox. Although this value is preferred to the outcome
0 in F , it cannot be attained in an uncooperative 1-stage game. If the CB
tests the willingness of the TU to cooperate and chooses unemployment u∗,
it is individually rational for the uncooperative TU to press for higher wages.
This is also true in a finitely repeated game with perfect information (this
follows from subgame perfection).
But what happens if a cooperative TU is introduced? This would result
in uncertainty about the TU preferences.16 Theoretically this scenario could
arise based on a different kind of unions’ preferences (or utility function).
Uncertainty of the CB about the true preferences of the TUs could be the
result of a latent principal-agent conflict between union members and their
representatives in the TU bureaucracy; see Traxler (2003). Therfore, it does
not have to be the case, that the CB is sure of a special utility function of
the TUs.
The first preference order is the above-mentioned uncooperative union
stance. This could also be regarded as ”myopic“ because gains in income
distribution can only be transitory as follows from mark-up price determina-
13According to Traxler (2003, p. 602) different modes of coordination are possible. It
need not be all-encompassing if one takes pattern bargaining into consideration.
14The outermost points to the right of each indifference contour constitute the Phillips
curve as reaction contour.
15See Carlin and Soskice (2006, p. 115) for a graphical exposition and Soskice and Iversen
(2001) for an analytical derivation.
16This point might reflect different experiences with unions’ wage policy in the past –
see Soskice (1990).
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tion of eq. 4. If the TU does not realize that excessively high wage claims will
be passed on to prices and, thus, result in higher inflation, the well-known
Phillips curve trade-off between unemployment and rising prices in Fig. 3
arises as a reaction contour of the TU.17
Fig. 3: Preferences of an
uncooperative union
Fig. 4: Preferences of a
cooperative union
The second possible TU preference order is the cooperative policy stance.
This could be explained as follows. As mentioned above, the TUs cannot be
successful in a distributional conflict. The share of wages in incomes is dic-
tated by the mark-up pricing of businesses. Under these circumstances, it is
rational for the unions not to follow the ”redistribution reflex“ if employment
increases. A rising employment level is in the interest of unions as it improves
the power balance in other negotiations such as over working conditions and
social security. That is why the cooperative union has a flat reaction con-
tour. In contrast to the steep Phillips curve in Figure 3 it can be argued
that the flat Phillips curve is not only short run. If the TU optimizes along
the flat Price-setting curve, it will tolerate a high employment levels in the
range from u∗∗ without triggering a wage-price spiral. Both possible reaction
contours of the unions are shown in Figure 4. The flat Phillips curve is in line
17In this case outcome T of Figure 3 results. This can be interpreted as an inflationary
Stackelberg equilibrium with monetary leadership.
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with the above mentioned argumentation of Soskice and Iversen (2001) and
Heise (2002b) that well coordinated TUs can internalize the external effects
which can result from too high wage claims.
In Figure 4 the payoffs for the cooperative TU are included. As in Fig-
ure 3 they are normalized. The least preferred payoff 0 is attained at high
unemployment in point F . An intermediate payoff results from an aggres-
sive wage policy in T . Most preferred is point C with payoff 1. What is
interesting here is that the CB can put something at risk if it expands the
economy to its own optimum unemployment rate u∗. The acceptance of risk
will be rewarded if the TU reacts in a moderate way. Thus, a precondition
for the CB considering an employment expansion as rewarding is a certain
probability ℘ that the union is cooperative.
In Table (2) we can see three possible outcomes of the game. If the
CB takes a risk then two relevant points emerge: T for the reaction of an
uncooperative TU and C for the reaction of a cooperative TU. The third
point is the fallback position F , where the CB puts nothing at risk.
trade union central bank
test abstain
cooperative C F
uncooperative T F
Table 2: Different outcomes in a single-stage game
Note that if the CB doesn’t expand the economy only point F can then
be reached regardless of which strategy the union chooses. The reason for
this is that the two types of union strategies coincide at the unemployment
level u∗∗ as their reaction contours intersect at this point (see Figure 4). If
the CB chooses the unemployment level u∗ the TU will react according to its
own preference order introduced above. This will prove especially interesting
in the repeated game which we shall analyse later on.
If we now introduce normalized payoffs for the CB in the reference points
C, T and F , we can integrate all payoffs in payoff matrices. For the CB the
highest payoff 1 is assigned to the bliss point C. Payoff 0 can be reached in
point T . If we assume a high priority of price stability as a counterweight
11
to the ambitious employment target, point F has the second order with
intermediate payoff c – this would entail flat indifference contours of the CB
as in Figure 2. A high c means a high relative weight on price stability. In
Table (3) and Table (4) the payoffs assigned to the reference points depending
on the type of TU are shown.
trade union central bank
test abstain
moderate (d ; 1) (0 ; c)
aggressive (1 ; 0) (0 ; c)
Table 3: Payoff pairs (TU,CB),
Case of an uncooperative TU
trade union central bank
test abstain
moderate (1 ; 1) (0 ; c)
aggressive (e ; 0) (0 ; c)
Table 4: Payoff pairs (TU,CB),
Case of a cooperative TU
The strategies ”moderate“ and ”aggressive“ refer to the optimum strate-
gies of the cooperative and the uncooperative TU respectively, if the CB
chooses the ”test“ strategy (low unemployment). The payoff pair in the first
cell of Table (3) – the pair (d; 1) – stands for a payoff d for the union and 1
for the CB.
Knowing the payoff structure of Table (3) and Table (4) and the prob-
ability ℘1 (union is cooperative) the CB can compare the expected utility
of expanding the economy or putting nothing at risk. Both strategies are
equally rewarding if:
℘1 · 1 + (1− ℘1) · 0 = c (16)
The left side stands for the expected payoff of an employment expansion
while the right side represents the riskless payoff. The resulting threshold
12
value for ℘1 is the CB’s payoff (utility) in point F . Thus, if ℘1 > c the ”test“
is more rewarding and the CB will expand the economy in the single-stage
game with imperfect information.
The dilemma for the activist CB is that if c increases, an employment
expansion becomes very improbable.18 The result seems paradoxical bearing
in mind that (implicit) cooperation would lead to better results for all actors
involved (also for the uncooperative TU which is assumed with a certain
probability 1 − ℘1). This leads to the interesting question of whether the
probability of an employment expansion could be raised if the game were
repeated. An answer shall be tried by using the concept of weak sequential
equilibrium in the next section.
3.2 Reputation effects in a repeated game
In this subsection we will analyse the interaction of the CB and TU in a
finitely repeated game that allows for reputation building. As a first step
towards a repeated game we will formalise the interaction as a local game,
which will be repeated finitely. The whole setting is comprised of n repeti-
tions of the local game from Figure 1. The game resembles the monopoly-
entrant game of Kreps and Wilson (1982a), in which a monopoly can attain
a reputation for being tough vis a` vis potential competitors.19
Kreps and Wilson (1982b) have suggested a special equilibrium concept
to solve this kind of game: sequential equilibrium. The spirit of that equi-
librium can be captured by the strategy ”Abstain first or you risk a costly
fight.“ This is not present here, as the payoff structure of the game under
consideration suggests another strategy: ”Risk something, it could be re-
18An example is an employment-friendly CB with a high preference for price stability.
The resulting indifference contours are flat ellipses - that is why F represents a relatively
high utility level as compared to the value in T .
19The original idea stems from Selten (1978). Although the situation seems somewhat
similar to our game there are some important modifications. The first affects the payoff
structure of Table (3) and Table (4), which is different from Kreps andWilson (1982a). The
second is that the actors don’t change from round to round. The CB can put something
at risk and choose the strategy ”test“ or run a more conservative policy, which shall be
called the ”abstain“ strategy. However, the union strategy stays the same.
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warded.“ Indeed, an uncooperative union could have an incentive to mirror
the behaviour of a cooperative union. This process is called ”attaining a
reputation“. Eventually the probability of employment expansion in the first
periods of the game rises.
A weak sequential equilibrium is comprised of a strategy profile and a
system of beliefs that satisfy the following two conditions:
1. Sequential rationality: Each player’s strategy is optimal in the part of
the game that follows each of their information sets, given the strategy
profile and their belief of the history in the information set that has
occurred.
2. Weak consistency of beliefs with strategies: For every information set
reached with positive probability given the strategy profile, the beliefs
are updated following Bayes’ rule.20
The term ”belief“ is used here to describe the probability distribution that the
CB assigns to the TU types.21 The first condition means that both players
play optimally in every point of the game. That means both maximize their
expected utility. In particular, an uncooperative TU can behave in such a
way that it influences the CB’s belief that it is dealing with a cooperative
union. The second condition describes the procedure of updating the beliefs
by the rule of Bayes, if it can be applied.
Now the equilibrium of the game will be described. Let n denote the
number of repetitions in the game, which are counted backwards (period n
is actually the starting period). ℘i stands for the CB’s belief in period i that
its counterpart is a cooperative union. The first belief must be assumed a
priori and it is denoted by ℘n = δ. As beliefs are central to the reputation
argument their updating from period i+1 to period i is described first:
• if CB tests and TU behaves aggressively then ℘i = 0,
• if CB tests and TU behaves moderately then ℘i = max {℘i+1, c
i},
20See Osborne (2004, p. 328).
21This is adopted from the definitions and preconditions of sequential equilibrium; see
Osborne (2004).
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• if CB abstains then ℘i = ℘i+1.
The first point follows from the fact that only an uncooperative TU is
tempted to choose an aggressive strategy if given the chance. The second
point reflects the reputation argument with a possible upward development
of the belief in the case of cooperative unions. The third point describes what
happens if nothing can be learned – the old information prevails.
The strategies of the CB are:
• if ℘i > c
i then test,
• if ℘i = c
i then test with probability 1− d,
• if ℘i < c
i then abstain.
The CB anticipates that an uncooperative TU will begin engaging to attain
a reputation if the initial belief is high enough (or the number of repetitions).
That’s why it will choose to test if ℘i passes a certain threshold, which is
determined by the relative weight of price stability in the CB’s utility – the
higher its preference for price stability, the higher the value of c.
The strategy of the cooperative TU can be summed up in one sentence:
it will always moderate. For the cooperative TU there is no incentive to play
aggressively, either in the short run or in the long run.
The strategies of the uncooperative TU are:
• if ℘i > c
i−1 then moderate,
• if ℘i ≤ c
i−1 then moderate with probability ℘i·(1−c
i−1)
(1−℘i)·ci−1
.
Thus, if the initial ℘n is high enough then the uncooperative TU will choose
a moderate strategy for a while to reap the fruits of cooperation.
The strategies of CB and uncooperative TU are depicted in Figure 5.
One can see on the left scale that by increasing the number of repetitions by
one the CB’s disposition to employment expansion moves to a higher range.
This range is dependent on the payoff c from the CB (see Table (3) and
Table (4)), which is determined by the relative weight on price stability in
the CB’s utility function.
This leads us to the three main results of our analysis:
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Fig. 5: Optimal strategies in period n
1. In a repeated game the probability of employment expansion increases
with the number of repetitions.
2. For employment expansion to occur, the relative weighting of price
stability in the CB’s utility function must not be too high, given a
certain initial value of the belief ℘n that the TU is cooperative.
3. For a given value of the CB’s relative preference for price stability, the
belief in the cooperativeness of the TU must not be too low for an
employment expansion to occur.
These results are all derived from the equilibrium strategy of the CB. First,
an augmentation of n reduces the initial threshold for the strategy test, as
the term cn < 1 diminishes with higher n. Secondly, cn diminishes slowly if
c ≈ 1. This is the case if there is a high preference for price stabilization
(flat indifference contours of the CB resulting in a high c). Thirdly, even
with a low threshold for employment expansion, if ℘n is even lower, then
employment expansion is not rewarding for the CB.
The first point is our main result. We have seen above that in a single-
stage game the threshold belief in the cooperativeness of the TU is c for an
employment expansion to occur. If the game is repeated n-fold, this threshold
falls to cn. We can provide a numerical example of this. If ℘1 = 0.9 in a
single-period game the probability of a cooperative TU must exceed 90% for
employment expansion to occur. With n = 5 repetitions this probability
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reduces to 0.95 = 0.59. In other words, a 60% probability of a cooperative
TU would suffice for the CB to stimulate employment expansion. This may
be regarded as the best opportunity for cooperation.
4 Concluding remarks in relation to EMU
In this paper we began with a conventional picture of interaction between
CB and TU – the NAIRU model in a Post Keynesian interpretation. This
model relies heavily on uncooperative TUs that will trigger a wage-price
spiral if given the chance (if unemployment sinks below the NAIRU). The
unconventional results of our above argumentation about effects of reputation
can only arise if there is some probability of a cooperative TU.
One could question whether this condition is met in Euroland at the
moment. At least in the recent announcements by ECB President Trichet
there are appeals to the trade unions to moderate their wage claims in the
presence of temporary price shocks.22 But these appeals might also be seen
as part of the ECB’s communication strategy. Otherwise one could interpret
them as a threat and, though this may augur badly for the future, they may
induce the TUs to cooperate. However – as has been shown in the article –
if the CB is not sufficiently employment friendly, the TUs cannot archieve a
reputation. Thus, mainstream conceptions of monetary neutrality and CB
conservatism may actually obstruct the availability of a high employment
equilibrium.
If European trade unions are willing and able to use their coordination
power at European level to establish a certain stability-oriented wage devel-
opment23, this does not mean employment expansion is assured. The ECB
mandate gives first priority to price stability. In economic cycles the ECB
seems to be quick to brake in an economic upturn but slow to use the acceler-
22See Trichet (2007), Trichet (2008).
23On this point see the argument of the Chief Economist of the European Trade Union
Institute Watt (2007), who suggests a formula comprised of the CB’s inflation target and
productivity. The central declaration of the European Trade Union Confederation ETUC
(2000) on this matter stresses a different wage formula, which includes actual inflation. So
there seems to be some work needed to reach a consensus.
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ator.24 This causes us to question how employment-friendly the ECB really
is. If the ECB does not have a high employment target, potential benefits of
wage moderation simply cannot materialize.
To escape the trap of a low employment equilibrium perhaps it would
be best for the macroeconomic actors mutually communicate. This is what
some Keynesian authors25 are proposing. That was also the intention of
the Cologne Process for macroeconomic dialogue at European level. Such a
process could be highly significant, as otherwise it is difficult for the actors in-
volved to identify cooperative contributions in a complicated macroeconomic
environment.
24See Bibow (2005, p. 12).
25See Dullien (2004, p. 220) and Heise (2001, p. 162 ff.).
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Mathematical Annex
Derivation of equilibrium strategies
First the equilibrium strategies are derived. After that we will show, that
they are optimal. We start with an indifference condition for the CB in the
last but one period (we have already treated the last period in the 1-period-
game):
℘2 · 1 + (1− ℘2) · y2 = c (17)
The left side (LS) are payoffs from an employment expansion, the right side
(RS) represents the riskless payoff (no employment expansion). LS payoffs
depend on the union type and strategy. A cooperative TU will always mod-
erate (1st summand), while a uncooperative TU will moderate only with
probability y2 (we will derive it below).
From condition 2 of the weak sequential equilibrium we know, that beliefs
are updated following Bayes’ rule. From that we can establish a connection
to the last period:
℘∗1 =
℘2
℘2 + (1− ℘2) · y2
= c (18)
and this gives us the equilibrium strategy y2 for the uncooperative TU in
Period 2:
y2 =
℘2 · (1− c)
(1− ℘2) · c
(19)
Here we can see, how equilibrium strategies are developed in an interplay
from the end of game. From backward induction this line of argumentation
is well known. Between 0 and c the function y2 is monotonically increasing
with maximum 1 in c. Above c the TU is no more indifferent as she can get
a higher payoff by choosing moderation (this will be shown later). Thus, the
limiting belief q2 for the uncooperative TU is c.
If we substitute Eq. (19) in Eq. (17) we get the limiting belief ℘∗1 =
c2 for which the CB is indifferent. Strategy test is rewarding if ℘2 > c
2.
Below c2 that point the CB should abstain from an employment expansion.
All other equilibrium strategies are derived inductively by similar line of
argumentation:
℘i · 1 + (1− ℘i) · yi = c (20)
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From our induction hypothesis we get
yi =
℘i · (1− c
n−1)
(1− ℘i) · cn−1
(21)
This is again the equilibrium strategy of the uncooperative TU26, from which
we can get the limiting belief for the uncooperative TU:
qi = c
n−1 (22)
If we substitute Eq. (21) in Eq. (20) we get the limiting belief for the CB in
period i:
℘∗i = c
n. (23)
Next the CB behaviour in her points of indifference ℘∗i = c
i shall be
considered. Again the consideration starts at the end of the game. If we
formalize an indifference condition for an uncooperative TU in period 227 we
can derive the CB probability of test in period 1:
d+ x1 · 1 = 1 + 0 (24)
The LS stands for the sum of payoffs which are possible if the uncooperative
TU moderates in period 2 (payoff d) and the CB in turn tests with probability
x1 in the following period 1. The RS includes the payoffs by an aggressive
strategy in period 2, after which the CB will choose abstention in period 1.
Rearranging Eq. (24) gives us the probability for test of an indifferent CB in
period 1:
x1 = 1− d (25)
Derivation of the other xi is done in the same manner. We just have to bear in
mind that the 2nd payoff in Eq. (24) must be replaced by the expected payoff
of the remaining i-1 periods (as their are different options for the remaining
TU behaviour):
d+ xi−1 · ν
TU
i−1 = 1 + 0 (26)
As the uncooperative TU under consideration was indifferent in period i, she
is also indifferent in period i-1. The reason is that the new ℘i−1 = c
i−1 is in
26Similar monotonicity considerations as above.
27Indifference requires c > ℘2.
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the range where the uncooperative TU is indifferent (℘i−1 ≤ c
i−2) – see the
construction of TU equilibrium strategies above. That’s why νTUi−1 = 1 which
is the payoff from aggressive action in period i-1. Knowing this we get:
xi−1 = 1− d (27)
This gives us all indifference strategies for the CB except for period n. In
the starting period the CB is free to choose her xn as there is no consistency
requirement.
Condition 1 of the weak sequential equilibrium: Opti-
mality
The optimal play of a cooperative TU is easiest to verify. If she chooses
aggression she can only loose in the short and the long run. One can see this
from the payoff matrix (short run) and the fact of foregone payoffs in the
future, as the CBs cooperativeness in the future is not enhanced.
The case of an uncooperative TU is more interesting. Before we can show
optimality of play we must derive expected payoffs νTnU from equilibrium
strategy. Expected payoffs depend on the initial belief ℘n:
1. νTUn = 0 if ℘n < c
n,
2. νTUn = 1− d if ℘n = c
n,
3. νTUn = (n− k(℘n))d+ 1 if c
n < ℘n = c
k(℘n)−1,
4. νTUn = (n− k(℘n))d+ 1 if c
n < ℘n < c
k(℘n)−1,
where k(℘n) = min {i : ℘n > c
n}.
In the first case ℘n < c
n the CB will never test. Thus the TU gets her
minimum payoff 0.
In the second case ℘n = c
n. The expected payoff can be derived indutively.
If n = 1 we know that the CB is indifferent and tests with probability 1−d. As
it is the last period the TU will choose an aggressive strategy and ν1 = 1−d.
This is our induction hypothesis. For the induction step we get:
νn+1 = (1− d) · yn+1 · (d+ νn(℘
∗
n)) + (1− d) · (1− yn+1) · 1 + d · 0 (28)
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We know from the induction hypothesis that nun(℘
∗
n) = 1− d. From this we
get:
νn+1 = 1− d (29)
which is what we wanted to show.
For the third case we must assume ℘n < 1 which is trivial. Then we
can conclude from our case differentiation that n ≥ 2. From the definition
of k(℘n) and the case differentiation we know that in period t = k(℘n) − 1
we reach the point of indifference which we have treated already in previous
case. Thus the expected payoff in the last k(℘n)− 1 periods equals 1− d. In
the first n− (k(℘n)− 1) periods the TU moderates (see her strategy) and we
get the sum of payoffs:
νn = (n− k(℘n)) · d+ 1 (30)
The fourth case is very similar to the third case. The switch point is
in period t = k(℘n). This is the first period where ℘t < q
∗
t . Thus the TU
plays a mixed strategy in this period, which results in a higher ℘t−1 in case of
moderation. Thus in case of moderation in period t we switch to a calculation
of the remaining expected payoff as in the previous case. The expected payoff
then amounts to:
νn = (n− k(℘n)) · d+ yt(℘n)(d+ νt−1(℘
∗
t−1)) + (1− yt(℘n)) · 1 (31)
Knowing νt−1(℘
∗
t−1) we get:
νn = (n− k(℘n)) · d+ 1 (32)
From these 4 cases optimality of play follows straightforwardly:
1. Here it obviously makes no difference how the TU behaves (see payoff
matrix).
2. If the TU chooses a different strategy in one of the periods i ∈ {n...2}
and ℘i > 0 that doesn’t matter for payoffs. The reason is that the
CB expects her indifference in these periods and will adapt beliefs ac-
cordingly. A higher payoff in period i therefore will result in foregone
subsequent payoffs of exactly the same size. Eventually if the TU would
switch to moderation in period n she has forgone payoff 1− d.
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3. Say the TU chooses aggression in period i, which is one of the first
n−k(℘n)+1 periods. This will cause the loss of all subsequent positive
payoffs. The payoff sum is reduced to (n− i)d+ 1 ≤ (n− k(℘n))d+ 1.
If the strategy swith takes place after k(℘n), then we can return to the
argumentation of the previous case, as the CB expects the TU to be
indifferent or there is a real loss in the last period.
4. The argument is similar to the previous case. The only difference is
that indifference grips 1 period earlier.
Now let’s turn to the CB. Again we start with an induction over her
payoffs. Expected payoffs depend on the initial belief ℘n:
1. νCBn = nc if ℘n < c
n,
2. νCBn = nc if ℘n = c
n,
3. νCBn = n− k(℘n) + 1 + (k(℘n)− 1) · c if c
n < ℘n = c
k(℘n)−1,
4. νCBn = n− k(℘n) +
℘n
ck(℘n)−1
+ (k(℘n)− 1) · c if c
n < ℘n < c
k(℘n)−1,
where k(℘n) = min {i : ℘n > c
n} as in the previous case differentiation.
In the first case the strategy test is not taken into consideration. The CB
gets her secure payoff all the time.
In the second case the CB is indifferent. We can get her expected payoff
inductively. In period 1 the indifference condition
ν1 = (1− d) · [℘
∗
1 + (1− ℘
∗
1) · y1 + (1− ℘
∗
1) · (1− y1) · 0] + dc
= (1− d)c+ dc
= c
holds. This is our induction hypothesis. We proceed with the induction step
n→ n+ 1:
νn+1 = (1− d) ·
[(
℘∗n+1 + (1− ℘
∗
n+1) · yn+1
)
· (1 + νn(℘
∗
n))
]
+(1− d) ·
[
(1− ℘∗n+1) · (1− yn+1) · nc
]
+ d(n+ 1)c
= (1− d) ·
[
cn+1 + c− cn+1 + ncn+2 + nc− ncn+2
]
+ d(n+ 1)c
= (1− d) · (n+ 1)c+ d(n+ 1)c
= (n+ 1)c
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The third case again rests on the second case. In the first n− k(℘n) + 1
periods the CB tests and the agressive TU moderates. Payoff n− k(℘n) + 1
accrues. In period k(℘n) − 1
28 the CB is indifferent and has an expected
payoff (k(℘n)− 1)c. Together this leads us to the result.
The fourth case rests on the third case. In the first n− k(℘n) periods the
CB gets payoff n − k(℘n). In period t = k(℘n) the TU switches to a mixed
strategy. Using yt =
c(1−ct−1)
1−ct
in the following expected payoff:
νt = (℘t + (1− ℘t) · yt) ·
[
1 + νt−1(℘
∗
t−1)
]
+(1− ℘t) · (1− yt) · (0 + (t− 1)c)
= ℘t + (n− 1)c℘t +
℘t
ct−1
− ℘t + (1− ℘t)(t− 1)c
=
℘t
ct−1
+ (t− 1)c
Together with the payoffs of the periods before k(℘n) this gives us the total
expected payoff.
Now we are prepared to show that the CB is playing optimally:
1. If the CB plays test in period i her expected payoff in that period is
reduced by c − ℘n
ci−1
> 029. If there is a future after that period case
2 would apply for the remaining expected payoff, as ℘i−1 is updated.
Thus the change in expected payoff only affects period i in a downward
direction.
2. If the CB behaves different in any period i with ℘i > 0 the uncoopera-
tive TU will not recognize it, as she expects a mixed strategy. Therefore
nothing changes, especially the expected payoffs stay the same as the
CB is acting at her indifference point anyway (the ℘i are updated to
their indifference values in case of previous moderations by TU). If
℘i = 0 because TU has played aggressive once, the CB will loose payoff
d if she tests.
28As in the above case differentiation ℘n 6= 1 and n ≥ 2 can be assumed.
29To see this one can take the second summand in the expected payoff from case 4 as
guideline which derives from the combination of test and moderation with probability yi.
One has also to bear in mind that ℘n < c
n.
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3. If the CB chooses abention in one of the first n−k(℘n)+1 periods, her
expected payoff in that period is reduced to c. Subsequent payoffs don’t
change as the beliefs stay the same. If the CB changes her strategy after
period k(℘n) there is no change in expected payoffs (see argumentation
in case 2).
4. The argument is similar to the previous case. The only difference is that
if the CB abstains in period k(℘n) there is foregone payoff
℘n
ck(℘n)−1
−c >
0. After period k(℘n) the CB would abstain further, but that wouldn’t
affect payoffs from these periods.
Condition 2 of the weak sequential equilibrium: Consis-
tency
According to the second condition of weak sequential equilibrium beliefs shall
be updated following Bayes’ rule whenever possible. In period i (≥ 2 as ℘i−1
shall be updated) this matters if the uncooperative TU is assumed to play a
mixed strategy – this is the case if ℘i ≤ c
i−1. If the TU behaves aggressively
the CB takes this as a proof for an uncooperative TU. Otherwise if the TU
moderates the CB updates her beliefs.
In period i the uncooperative TU will choose probability yi =
℘i·(1−c
i−1)
(1−℘i)·ci−1
for moderation. If we choose co./unco. as abbreviations for the incidence
that there is a cooperative/uncooperative TU and mod. for moderation we
can apply Bayes’ rule for the derivation of ℘i−1:
℘i−1 = P (co.| mod.)
= P (co. and mod. | mod.)
=
P (mod. | co.) · P (co.)
P (mod. | co.) · P (co.) + P (mod. | unco.) · P (unco.)
=
1 · ℘i
1 · ℘i + yi · (1− ℘i)
=
℘i
℘i +
℘i·(1−ci−1)
(1−℘i)·ci−1
(1− ℘i)
=
℘i
℘i +
℘i·(1−ci−1)
ci−1
= ci−1
25
This is the formula for the updated ℘i−1 which was posited in the equilibrium
CB strategy as the first part of ℘i−1 = max {℘i, c
i−1} was supposed to be
smaller then ci−1 in the outset.
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